Entertaining Satan: Why We Tolerate Terrorist Incitement by Koppelman, Andrew
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 2 Article 8 
2017 
Entertaining Satan: Why We Tolerate Terrorist Incitement 
Andrew Koppelman 
Northwestern University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Computer Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, 
Criminal Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Koppelman, Entertaining Satan: Why We Tolerate Terrorist Incitement, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 535 
(2017). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss2/8 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 535 
ENTERTAINING SATAN:  




Words are dangerous.  That is why governments sometimes want to 
suppress speech.  The law of free speech reflects a settled decision that, at the 
time that law was adopted, the dangers were worth tolerating.  But people 
keep dreaming up nasty new things to do with speech. 
Recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist 
organizations have employed a small army of Iagos on the internet to recruit 
new instruments of destruction.1  Some of what they have posted is protected 
speech under present First Amendment law.  In response, scholars have 
suggested that there should be some new exception to the law of free speech.2  
Thus far, no workable exception has been suggested. 
American free speech law could ban certain noxious forms of incitement, 
as has been done in other countries.3  But in doing that, we would, to a certain 
extent, give up being a nation of adults. 
Anwar al-Awlaki, a planner of terrorist operations forAl Qaeda who was 
eventually killed by an American drone strike, maintained a website that 
defended terrorist violence.4  One of its readers was Nidal Hassan, who also 
exchanged emails with al-Awlaki.5  None of the email exchanges were 
explicitly conspiratorial, and no immediate plans were discussed.6  Hassan 
 
*  John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern 
University.  Thanks to Martin Redish for comments on an earlier draft.  Portions of this Article 
are revised from an earlier piece in the Northwestern Law Review. See Andrew Koppelman, A 
Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125 
(2016).  This Article was prepared for the Fordham Law Review symposium entitled Terrorist 
Incitement on the Internet held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the 
symposium, see Alexander Tsesis, Foreword:  Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2017). 
 
 1. See generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET:  THE NEW ARENA, THE 
NEW CHALLENGES (2006). 
 2. See, e.g., infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 3. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 35 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
 4. Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech:  Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1145, 1167–68 (2013). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. (reporting that the email exchanges “gave no indication that [Nidal Hassan] had 
any immediate plans to carry out . . . an attack”). 
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eventually shot to death thirteen soldiers at Fort Hood in Texas.7  Later, al-
Awlaki defended the killing spree as “a heroic act” and “a wonderful 
operation.”8 
Ali Amin, a lonely Virginia teenager, was drawn into the virtual world of 
ISIS, where he found a welcoming community.9  Eventually he was induced 
to provide logistical support, showing the organization how to secretly 
transfer funds and driving one recruit to the airport.10  He was convicted of 
material support of terrorism and sentenced to eleven years in prison.11 
American free speech doctrine will not permit this speech to be 
criminalized, so long as it falls short of direct solicitation or conspiracy.  
Incitement to law violation is constitutionally protected, unless it falls within 
the narrow Brandenburg v. Ohio12 exception:  “the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy 
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”13  Imminent means really imminent; even an indefinite 
time later in the day does not satisfy the standard.14 
Generalized praise of ISIS, or even of terrorist violence, is protected 
speech.  Brandenburg allows people to preach 
that the Islamic State is a social movement devoted to protecting Muslims 
and fighting an unfair global economic system; that it does not discriminate 
on the basis of race or nationality; that it uses violence in self-defense and 
in ways that mimic Western films and video games; and that Westerners 
who join the fight in Syria and Iraq are normal people fighting a just war.15 
Why should free speech doctrine ever tolerate speech that advocates violation 
of the law?  And if it ever tolerates it, why draw the line here? 
Government tries to censor speech because it thinks, often reasonably, that 
the speech will cause something bad to happen.  Before the development of 
modern free speech law, speech could be punished “[i]f the natural and 
 
 7. Id. at 1168. 
 8. Id. at 1167–68. 
 9. Scott Shane et al., Americans Attracted to ISIS Find an ‘Echo Chamber’ on Social 
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/us/americans-
attracted-to-isis-find-an-echo-chamber-on-social-media.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/D9EL-
LVFA]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 13. Id. at 448. 
 14. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that advocating for 
illegal activity at an indefinite time in the future is not imminent); see also NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (“This Court has made clear, however, 
that mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection 
of the First Amendment.”).  A few recent lower court cases have dramatically relaxed the 
imminence requirement, but these are inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court doctrine and are 
unlikely to endure. See Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 655, 669–70 (2009). 
 15. Shane et al., supra note 9. 
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reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law.”16  But 
as Justice Louis Brandeis observed, this test bars any criticism of the status 
quo:  “Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase 
the probability that there will be a violation of it.”17 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made a more general point:  “Every idea is 
an incitement.  It offers itself for belief, and if believed, it is acted on unless 
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement 
at its birth.”18  If government can suppress speech that is likely to produce 
law violation, then it can suppress any speech that criticizes the law on the 
books—and that is the end of democracy.  The Brandenburg standard was 
adopted in response to that problem.19  Does it allow too much? 
The trouble with an insistence on imminence was explained long ago by 
Justice Edward T. Sanford: 
[T]he immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the 
effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen.  The State cannot 
reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in 
the nice balance of a jeweler’s scale.  A single revolutionary spark may 
kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and 
destructive conflagration.  It cannot be said that the State is acting 
arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the 
measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to 
extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or 
blazed into the conflagration.  It cannot reasonably be required to defer the 
adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary 
utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and 
immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its 
judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency.20 
Sanford could have been talking about ISIS.  So could Robert Bork:  
“Cumulatively [dangerous utterances] may have enormous influence, and yet 
it may well be impossible to show any effect from any single example.”21 
Laurence Tribe is too sanguine when he writes that the imminence 
requirement is “an additional safeguard for the harmless inciter.”22  Some 
inciters whom Brandenburg protects are not harmless.  Rodney Smolla, 
defending Brandenburg, observes that “[g]overnments at all places and at all 
times tend to exaggerate dangers when they move against speech,” and that 
“[i]n virtually every freedom of speech case involving political dissent that 
 
 16. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917).  The court also required “the 
words [to be] used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance,” but since it left that question to 
the jury, it was not much of a barrier to prosecuting unpopular speakers. Id. 
 17. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 18. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 19. James Weinstein, The Story of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten:  Judge Learned Hand, 
First Amendment Prophet, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 61, 78–83 (Richard Garnett & 
Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012). 
 20. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669 (majority opinion). 
 21. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
33 (1971).  For a similar objection, see LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION? 76–77 (2005). 
 22. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-09, at 849 (2d ed. 2000). 
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has ever reached the United States Supreme Court for resolution, no palpable 
harm ever in fact occurred.”23  That is not true of terrorist incitement.  There 
have been serious harms, and more are probably coming. 
The law is not utterly helpless to deal with terrorist propaganda on the web.  
Some of it may rise to the level of conspiracy and solicitation.  Some may 
incite imminent lawless conduct and so may be unprotected under 
Brandenburg.  Some may constitute true threats—another unprotected 
category of speech.  Some may constitute material support for terrorism, 
which is unprotected even when it consists of speech.24  But quite a lot of 
terrorist incitement does not fall into any of these categories.  So where to 
draw the line? 
The problem is a tough one, and I cannot solve it.  I can say that the 
modifications of free speech law that have been proposed do not solve it.  
Cass Sunstein would get rid of Brandenburg’s imminence requirement:  “If 
(and only if) people are explicitly inciting violence, perhaps their speech does 
not deserve protection when (and only when) it produces a genuine risk to 
public safety, whether imminent or not.”25  As we have already seen, 
however, long-term risk is hard to assess.  Sunstein’s proposal is not as bad 
as the old “natural and reasonable effect” test,26 but it does authorize the same 
kind of judicial guesswork.  One would want a reason to believe that this 
modification of Brandenburg would do good in some actual case.  In the 
stories of terrorist incitement that have motivated our inquiry, the speakers 
have always been overseas, beyond the jurisdiction of American courts.  
Creating a new category of unprotected speech will not help if the law cannot 
reach the speakers. 
Eric Posner responds to this difficulty by targeting readers, not speakers.27  
He proposes 
a law that makes it a crime to access websites that glorify, express support 
for, or provide encouragement for ISIS or support recruitment by ISIS; to 
distribute links to those websites or videos, images, or text taken from those 
websites; or to encourage people to access such websites by supplying them 
with links or instructions.28 
 
 23. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 116 (1992); see DANIEL 
FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 70–71 (3d ed. 2010). 
 24. See Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651 (2017) 
(analyzing these categories and discussing their applicability). 
 25. Cass R. Sunstein, Islamic State’s Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 
2015), https://origin-www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-state-s-challenge 
-to-free-speech [http://perma.cc/E28U-2VDY]. 
 26. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (holding that a person can be 
convicted of incitement if illegal conduct was the “natural tendency and reasonably probable 
effect” of the speech). 
 27. Posner’s skepticism about the Brandenburg standard is also developed in ERIC A. 
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:  SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS 230–34 (2007). 
 28. Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec. 
15, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/ 
12/isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html 
[http://perma.cc/RM8X-FTS2]. 
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There is, of course, a problem of notice:  how can one tell whether the 
website one is looking at crosses the line?  Posner suggests the following 
solution: 
The law would provide graduated penalties.  After the first violation, a 
person would receive a warning letter from the government; subsequent 
violations would result in fines or prison sentences.  The idea would be to 
get out the word that looking at ISIS-related websites, like looking at 
websites that display child pornography, is strictly forbidden.29 
But if the authorities know that someone is spending time with this 
material, then less draconian responses immediately suggest themselves.  Ali 
Amin was seventeen years old.30  Had his parents been told what he was 
doing, they could have intervened very effectively.  More generally, when 
consumers of this material are detected, there are plenty of ways to respond 
to them without criminalizing the underlying speech. 
Posner acknowledges that scholars and journalists may have legitimate 
reasons for wanting to look at terrorist incitement on the internet.  He 
responds by trying to define a class of privileged readers:  “[T]he law could 
contain broad exemptions for people who can show that they have a 
legitimate interest in viewing ISIS websites.  Press credentials, a track record 
of legitimate public commentary on blogs and elsewhere, academic 
affiliations, employment in a security agency, and the like would serve as 
adequate proof.”31  Evidently we would get a modern analogue of the old 
Catholic Index of Forbidden Books, which could be read only with 
permission from the sacred congregation of the Roman Inquisition.32 
The law cannot reach the speakers.  If it detects the listeners, and the speech 
has not yet risen to the level of conspiracy, then there is a lot that you can do 
short of punishment for that subset of listeners—no one knows how large a 
subset—who present a danger.  But why protect this worthless, dangerous 
speech in the first place? 
In modern free speech theory, there has been a persistent puzzle about 
whether those who reject democracy are entitled to free speech.33  Alexander 
Meiklejohn offered the classic response:  “A government is maintained by 
the free consent of its citizens only so long as the choice whether or not it 
shall be maintained is recognized as an open choice, which the people may 
debate and decide, with conflicting advocacies, whenever they may 
choose.”34  Meiklejohn’s argument is essentially the same as John Milton’s 
original defense of free speech offered in 1644:  in order for the choice of 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Shane et al., supra note 9. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Index Librorum Prohibitorum, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Index-Librorum-Prohibitorum [http://perma.cc/NC6E-
PVMA] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 33. Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954:  A Proposed Legal-Political 
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 186–89 (1956); Bork, supra note 21, at 31. 
 34. Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 
461, 468 (1953).   
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good to be authentic, there must be a real option to choose evil.35  People 
must learn to cope with evil thoughts.  “He that can apprehend and consider 
vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet 
distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring 
Christian.”36  The way to be virtuous is “to ordain wisely as in this world of 
evil, in the midst whereof God hath placed us unavoidably.”37 
God thus allowed the serpent to tempt Adam and Eve.  That did not go 
well.  Some proponents of free speech have been forthright about the dangers.  
Justice Holmes wrote that free speech “is an experiment, as all of life is an 
experiment.”38  Justice Brandeis thought that maintaining a free society 
required courage.39 
Whenever people are treated as adults, with the power to make their own 
choices, they may make them badly.  The value of free speech is that it 
enables us to be awake, to be conscious of what we are doing, and to be aware 
of the options available to us.  Treating people as adults is dangerous because 
we do not know what they will do if they entertain Satanic ideas or allow 
themselves to be entertained by those ideas.  Some people visit Islamic 
radical websites out of pure curiosity.  It is impossible for a censor to know 
what effect any text will have on its audience, because readers are so 
diverse.40 
Recent work on the cultural specificity of ideals of free speech and their 
roots in dissenting Protestantism raises the question whether the idea of free 
speech has anything to offer to non-Western civilizations.41  Democracy 
provides a familiar answer:  authoritarian government has the same 
pathologies everywhere, and official accountability is impossible without 
 
 35. The Miltonic roots of Meiklejohn are elaborated in Andrew Koppelman, You’re All 
Individuals:  Brettschneider on Free Speech, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2014).  Another 
similarly Miltonic formulation is as follows:   
If men are not free to ask and to answer the question, “Shall the present form of our 
government be maintained or changed?”; if, when that question is asked, the two 
sides of the issue are not equally open for consideration, for advocacy, and for 
adoption, then it is impossible to speak of our government as established by the free 
choice of a self-governing people. 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 123 (1960). 
 36. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in JOHN MILTON:  COMPLETE POEMS 
AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 728 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957). 
 37. Id. at 733. 
 38. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 39. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:  The 
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988). 
 40. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1635, 1662 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Eros, Civilization, and Harry Clor, 31 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 855, 863–64 (2007). 
 41. See, e.g., JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS:  FREE SPEECH AND THE 
LIBERAL TRADITION 93 (2005) (“Comparative modernization studies suggest that cultures with 
strong support for free expression are clustered in the Protestant cultural zone of northern 
Europe and America, plus Australia and New Zealand, and even there it does not have uniform 
support.  For Africa, Latin America, southern and eastern Europe, and Asia, absolutist 
tolerance of offense is rarely the majority public opinion.”). 
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free speech.  But another answer is that free speech provides an opportunity 
to close the “gulf that separates class from class and soul from soul,”42 as 
George Bernard Shaw’s Henry Higgins put it.  Seana Shiffrin argues that, 
“given that our minds are not directly accessible to one another, speech and 
expression are the only precise avenues by which one can be known as the 
individual one is by others.”43  Censorship enacts “a sort of solitary 
confinement outside of prison but within one’s mind.”44  Because free 
communication is essential to avoid this pathology, it is a fundamental human 
right.45 
Free speech welcomes the open collision of moral views, which many 
people will find troubling.  When John Stuart Mill’s classic defense of free 
speech balances liberty against harm, Jeremy Waldron has observed, that 
balancing cannot count the moral distress of having your most cherished 
views denounced as harm or of contemplating ways of life antithetical to your 
own.46  A core value of free speech is that it will and must induce such 
distress.  Mill, and liberalism more generally, places great value on “ethical 
confrontation—the open clash between earnestly held ideals and opinions 
about the nature and basis of the good life.”47  Moral distress, “far from being 
a legitimate ground for interference, . . . is a positive and healthy sign that the 
processes of ethical confrontation that Mill called for are actually taking 
place.”48  Part of the reason for protecting illiberal ideas is that they promise 
to induce that distress.49 
Free speech aims to create a distinctive kind of human character—open to 
all ideas, inquisitive, ready to be challenged—and a social environment in 
which that kind of character can thrive.50  One cultivates that character by 
encountering ideas radically at odds with one’s own.  Mill observes that in 
order to do that, one 
must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who 
defend them in earnest and do their very utmost for them.  He must know 
them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole 
force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter 
 
 42. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, PYGMALION (1913), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SHAW:  
COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES 189, 248 (1962). 
 43. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS:  ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 
88–89 (2014). 
 44. Id. at 91. 
 45. Id. at 117. 
 46. See Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:  
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 115, 119–20 (1993). 
 47. Id. at 120. 
 48. Id. at 125.  Waldron’s more recent call for restriction of hate speech is in tension with 
this argument. See Andrew Koppelman, Waldron, Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech, 43 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1201, 1215–21 (2012). 
 49. This is one reason why the protection of dissent is so central to the free speech 
tradition. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 87 
(1990). 
 50. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character:  From Milton to Brandeis to the 
Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:  FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 60, 61 (Lee C. Bollinger 
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance:  Tunnel 
Constructivism in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 707–15 (2013). 
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and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of 
truth which meets and removes that difficulty.51 
Any citizen of a liberal society might have a legitimate reason to read the 
recruitment literature of ISIS.  No one can think intelligently about the 
challenge of Islamic radicalism, or of any other illiberal ideology, without 
spending at least a little time thinking about it from the inside.  More 
generally, one cannot think intelligently about evil without entertaining evil 
points of view.  The fearless, open character that liberal society seeks to 
cultivate cannot worry about whether one is permitted to look at this or that.52 
Harry Kalven was right that the incitement question is “the area in which 
the claims of censorship are at once most compelling and most dangerous to 
key values in an open society.”53  The American approach is risky.  Most 
countries do not do it that way; they unapologetically censor hate speech and 
incitement.54  Maybe they have no choice, but they are treating their citizens 
as children who are not competent to consider these issues for themselves.  
So would we.  And for what? 
 
 51. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 99 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) 
(1859). 
 52. See George Kateb, The Freedom of Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM 
WITHOUT ILLUSIONS:  ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. 
SHKLAR 220, 235 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996). 
 53. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 119 
(1988). 
 54. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 32–35; Tsesis, supra note 24, at 676. 
